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Woodrow Wilson:
A Failure of Leadership
A Broken Middle East
Timothy P. O'Brien, MPAff
The University of Texas, Austin
"No one in America or in Europe eithel, knows nry mind and I am not willing to trt st them to attempt to interplet if'l
-Woodrow Wilson, October, l9l7
President Woodrow Wilson failed to
ngage and lead the Great Powers at the Paris
Peace Conference in 1919, thereby missing the
opportunity to influence and shape the eventual
outcomes of their far-reaching policy decisions.
Had he been more effsctiv€ there, many ofthe
dysfunctions in the Middle East may well not
exist today.
The history of tlle Middle East is at
once complex, contentious, and convoluted. The
image of a peaceful Middl€ East is hard to
conceive today. Former president ofthe United
States, Jirmy Carter, \wote, "The Middle East is
perhaps the most volatile and coveted region of
the world, one whose instability is alrnost
certainly the greatest tbreat to world peace."2
However, in 1914, ar the height ofa period of
intemational struggles for power called lhe
"Great Game," the Middle East was a quiel and,
for the most part, calrn area ofthe world.
It was during President Woodrow
Wilson's administration that the modem Middle
East cam€ into existence at the end of Wo d
War I (WWf (1918) with the Treaty of
Versailles ( I 9 I 9), which dismantled the Ottoman
Empire. This realignment, in conjunction with
the establishment ofthe League ofNations,
changed the world dramatically as it ushered in a
new era of intemational relations. For more tlan
eighty years, war, conflict, terrorism, and despair
have marred the lands that are considered the
cradle of civilization. Every American president
since Franklin D. Roosevelt, in order io establish
America's intemational leadership, has faced
difficult public policy decisions related to the
Middle East. The attacks on the United States of
September I l, 2001 brought new interesl
attention, and more complex policy questions
relaled to the AIab world in a quest to understand
its apparent conflict with the West.
Volumes have been written on the
diverse causes ofthe unrest in the modem
Middle East. These range from Jimmy Carter's
Blood ofAbraham, a broad overview ofthe
political, economic and religious climate, to
Beqiamin Shwadran's notable yr'ork, ?he Middle
EasL Oit ahd the Greqt Paqers, focusing on the
zeal for control of oil by the world's great
powers, to the writings of Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei's Islamic firndamental religious
ideological "fatwas" (holy orders) calling for a
"jihad" (holy rar) against the West. There are
many questions and opinions as to the reasons
for the conflict which are complex and lend
themselves to empirical scrutiny. This article
explores Woodrow Wilson's concepts,
intentions, and diplomatic effectiveness at the
Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Placed in a
narrower context, it will examine the
ramifications of Woodrow Wilson's foreign
policy and actions regarding the Middle East.
And, it will establish that Woodrow Wilson's
actions, his policy, and his failwe of leadership
contributed to creating the foundation for the
turmoil in the Middle East of today.
Woodrow Wilson and the Modern Presidency
To understand Woodrow Wilson and
his policies, decisions, and leadenhip style, it is
necessary to examine his background and the
world in which he lived. Wilson was educated,
erudite, boldly creative, altruistic, complex, and
had a high sense ofpersonal morali4'. These
qualities would guide this minister's son in all he
did and the manner in which he viewed the
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world. Wilson was a deep political thinker, he
was not a career potitician and great$ disliked
the give and take ofpolitical negotiation. In
1919, Wilson's official biographer, joumalist
Ray Stannard Bakor wrote of hirn, "There is no
mal living in the world tG.day who is such a
master ofthe art ofpresenting ideas, ideals,
arguments...no man more captivating."i
Wilson's political career was very short,
having ascended to the gov€morship ofNew
Jeney in 1 9 I 0 alter being President of Princeton
University- After serving two years as governor,
he was elected President ofthe United States in
I 9 I 2, an election that author and historian James
Cbace called, "a definins moment in American
bistory."a Chace went on-to write olthe l9t2
election that it recalled, ". ..the great days of
Jefferson and Hamilton, when lesders did not
shy away from tackling tlle central question of
America's exceptional destiny."5 Wilson was
elected in a four-way face, in large par! due to I
split in the Republican Party when former
President Theodore Roosevelt opposed the
incumbent Republican President William
Howard Taft. Wilson, a Democrat, became the
twenty-eighth president ofthe United States and
would serve two terms. Arthu Stanley Link
wrote that Wilson, "...was privileged to guide
the destinies ofhis comay during eight ofthe
most critical years ofthe modem epoc[h]."6
Woodrow Wilson is considered by many
scholars, such as Jeftey Tulis and James Chace,
as the flirst ofthe *modem presidens.''7
The modem presidency bears little
resemblance to the one the framen ofthe
Constitution envisioned. The term "modem
presidency" emerged as the poticy making
powers ofthe Executive grew in a changing
world. Throughout the nin€teenth century,
Congress dominated the administration of
government, and dle president, with few
exceptions like Abraham Lincoh. was in essence
a ceremonial position operating in th€
backgromd. During the ptesidency of Theodore
Roosevelt, a sAonger Executivg began to gmerge
with the expansion ofthe president"s role in
proposing desired legislation and involvement in
foreign affairs (e.g. Roosevelt's use ofthe U.S.
naval presence in foreign ports witb his "gun-
boat diplomacy"). Further, it was in this rime that
the media emerged and their influence increased,
changing how presidents would be viewed and
interpreted. Contributing to this, Wilson would
be the first president to have regularly scheduled
press conferences.E While Roosevelt began the
transition of expanding presidential power, it
was Wilson who revised the perception of the
Executive. Tulis wrote, "...Franklin
Roosevelt- 
. .would be crediled by many scholars
with founding the 'modem presidency,' but the
practice began with Theodore Roosevelt, and the
legitimizing doctrine was uttered by Wilson.,,e
Wilson believed that the president,s role
was much like that of a prime minister in a
parliamentary system ofgovemm€nt and could
be as large as the president desired. r0 This
notion has not been lost on some ofhis
successors. In 1908, four years before being
elected president, Wilson wrote in his revised
edition of Constitutionql Gover nment.-
His capacity will set the linit; and if
Congress be overborne b' hin, it will
be no fault of the makers of the
Constitution--it 
',till be from no lack of
constitutional powers on its pqrt, bul
only because the Presi.lent hqs the
nqtion behind him, and Congress has
not. He has no means of compelling
Congress,except I hrough publ ic
opinion."
Wilson believed the president had the mandate of
the people and that the president was beholden
only to the people. He became the first presiden!
since John Adams to deliver the State ofthe
Union as a verbal address to Congress instead of
a )vritten report. In doing this, he believed
himselfto be addressing the p€ople, and through
the people he would reach and influence
Congress. Tulips urote, "Wilson self-
consciously changed nearly 150 years ofpractice
because he thought that th€ Constitution
provisions, though arguably intended to promote
leadership through rhetoric, had not in fact
enhanced energl in the Executive."r2
As a presidential candidate and
immediately following his election, Wilson
viewed himself as a president who was most
interested and comfortable with domestic affairs.
He was the first to propose a large block of
legislation called the "New Freedom," which
included measures for labor, reform oftariffs,
and protection for consumers. Wilson proposed
the legislation that would become the Federal
Reserve System and his other domestic proposals
included the Adamson Act, the Clalton Anti-
Trust Act, and the Federal Trade Commission.13
Ironically, it would be in the foreign
policy arena where Wilson would have the
opportunity to leave his most lasting mark.
Wilson had never given much thought to foreign
affuirs and on the way to his first inauguration in
1913, Wilson stated, "lt would be an irony of
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fate if my administration had to chiefly deal with
foreign affairs, for all my preparation has been in
domestic matters."ra He was the first president to
participate in summits with foreign leaders and
he held lhe csntral idea that th€ United States
would take over the role ofworld leadership that
Great Britain had held for decades. Once
circumstances dictated that he become heavily
involved in foreign affairs, he saw his role as the
promoter ofwell-being for all peoples. Wilson
conceived the notion of an organization to ensure
world peace and prolect natural rights that came
to be known as the League ofNations. The
historian Lloyd E. Ambrosius credited him as
being the architact ofthis international lea€ue
that was designed by the many plenipotentiaries,
and their staIB, to the Paris Peace Conference
and was a product ofthe Treaty ofVersailles. 15
Although the Unired $ates never joined dre
League, Wilson believed adamantly in its
purpose, Etating, "There is only one possible
sandard by which to determine controversies
between the United States and other nations, and
that is compounded ofthese two elements: our
own honor and our obligations to the peace of
the world."t6
Wilson became president at a time
when the majority of Americans did not realize
how interdependent the world really was. He
believed that intemational morality coincided
wilh American liberal values. Wilson rwote that
'Just givemmen|" which rested "upon the
consenl ofxhe governed" was not only a
fundamental element of democratic theory, but it
was also a fundamental part of good foreign
relations.l? Arthur Stanley Link \rrote, "He
believed that all peoples were capable of self-
govemment because all were endowed with the
inherent charact€r and capacity for gro*th."r8
From these thoughts came the basis ofhis
foreign policy and his convictions relating to the
concept of "self-determination."
The Concept of "Self-determination"
The concept of " selldetermination"
was an integral component of Wilson's vision of
world peace. The concept justified the
emergence ofethnic and cultural groups and
provided a method to establish for themselves
their own nationalistic compositions, including
self-selection of government form and
leadership. The $ritings ofthe irish bom, British
statesman Edmu d Burke inspired Wilson as a
student. Burke's wdtings on "free govemmenf'
helped Wilson develop the concept of"self-
determination." Burke \arote, "If any ask me
what liee govemment is, I answer lhat, for any
practical purpose, it is what the people think so;
and that they, and not I, are the natural, lawful,
and competont judges of this matter."re Altbough
Wilson, as a young scholar, had been thinking
about the concept as early as 1897, he first used
the term "self-determination" on Febnrary I l,
I 9 I 8 \ryhen he stated, "Peoples may now be
dominated and governed by their own consent.
'Self-determination' is not a mere phrase, It is an
imperative principle of action, which statesmen
will henceforth ignore at their peril."2o In
discussing "self-determination," l,riter and
political commentator Walter Lippmann wrote in
1922 that countries, ".. .had to meet th€ national
aspirations of each people, and yet to limit thosc
aspirations so that no one nation would regard
itself a catspaw of another."2r
It must be considered what Wilson
meant exactly by the term "selGdelermination."
His writings seam to indicate that "self-
determination" was acceptable as long as it
applied to democratic "self-determination." After
the Armistice was signed in 1918, Wilson
proclaimed to a joint session ofCongress tlat
'the establishment of demoffary thmughout the
world" was the American mission. This policy,
however, could have violated the very notion of
"self-determination" itself. Wilson's Secretary
of State, Robert Lansing, expressed his
opposition to Wilson's concept saying it was, "a
calamiry that Wilson had ever hit on the
pbrase."22 Further, he went on to sate. "lt will
raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I
fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is
bound to be disoedited, to be called the dr€am of
an idealist who failed to realize the danger until
it was too late to check those who attempt to put
the principle into force."23 Another Wilson uitic,
economist John Maynard Ke).nes wrote thal the
concept of"self-determination" did not make
sense, " . . . except as an ingenious formula for
rearranging the balance ofpower in one's olm
interest."2a
Today, more than eighty years after
Wilson conceived the notion, the concept of
"seltdetermination" is still discussed and
debated as the r orld, most notably the war
stricken lands ofthe Middle East and th€
reputrlics ofthe former Soviet Union, grapple
with the problems that affect emerging nations.
"Self-determination" is one ofthe principle
tsnets ofthe United Nations Chader (Chapter I,
Article I, Number 2): "To develop friutdly
relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and "self-determination"
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of peoplss, and to take other appropriate
measures 10 strsngthen universal peace.. . "s
"The I'ourteen Points'
Prior to the Paris Peace Conference of
l9lq where the conditions for peace would be
negotiated for the ending of WWI, Wilson
delivered a speech to ajoint session ofthe
United states Congress on January 8, 1918,
outlining his "Fowteen Point$" (Appendix I) as
the guide for negotiation of "a just peace" for
wwl.?6 The first frve points delineated concepts,
including no secet side treaties, Aeedom of
navigation, removal oleconomic barrien, arms
reduction, and "self-dEtemination." The next
eight addressed political and territorial issues.
And, the fourt€enth point called for the
establishment ofan organization "...for the
purpose of affording mulual guarantees of
political indepandence and territorial
inlegrity..."" This last point would be the basis
for the League ofNations.
Lippmann wrote ofthe "Fourteen
Points" that they repr€sefted "the idoa of stating
'peace ierms' instead of 'war aims'.. ."28 There
wzrs great enthusiasm for the "Fourteen Points"
because everyone could find what they wanted in
them. Further, Lippmann wrote, "The phases, so
pregnant with under$ing conflicts ofthe
civilized world, were accepted. They stood for
opposing ideas, but they evoked a comnron
€motion. And to the extent they played a part in
rallying the westem peoples for the ten months
ofwar which tley still had to endure."2e The
points could inspire all peoples io develop their
own expectations and hopes conceming th€
future peace.
The "Fourteen Points" wer€ translated
into many languages and widely distrit uted.
They were hailed and praised in many countries,
inctuding Germany, because they damonstrated a
broad desire to resolve conflicts and understand
'?hy the war was being fought."3o They were
transmitted via radio, printed in newspapers, and
as leaflets dropped from planes and balloons-
lngenuity prevailed when leaflets, "...were even
stuffed into empty artillery shells and lobbed
over the German linEs."!rAs a result of his work
on the "Fourteen Points," and their wid€
distribution, very high q!.?eclations were set for
Wilson and he was viewed as the great
peacemaker, visionary, and philosopher whose
leadership would establish world peace.
While hailed and praised, the "Fourteen
Points" were also confoversial. David Fromkin
\4.rote that some viewed them as, " . . . simply a
rmilateral American pronormcement rather than a
declmation of Allied policy."32 Each ofthe
Allied Powers had their own specific desires and
motivations that did not necessarily coincide
with the "Fourtee Points." Ambrosius wrote
that it was believed they represented a "Utopian
scheme" by establishing the yision of a new
world order." Further, according to Ambrosius,
Wilson believed that the world should be made
safe for democracy,sa
Wilson, the first American president to
go io Europe while in ofiice, traveled to the Paris
Peace Conference first by ship, the George
Washington, and.then by rail to Paxis. Upon
landing at Brest, France on December 13, 1918,
his populadty was evident as he received a
hero's welcome, with ships of the American.
British, and French navies firing salvos in salute
and the city was awash with signs proclaiming
"Vive I'Amdrique!" and "Vive Wilsonl" The
French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichorl
indicating his approval of Wilson's concept of
peace, offrcially welcomed him with, "We are so
thankful that you have come over to give us the
right kind ofpeace."rj
The Paris Perce Conference
The Paris Peace Conference was
convened in January 1919 for the purpose of
establishing the conditions to which the defeated
enemies would conform at the end of WWI, the
war to end all wars. This great internatiolal war
involved conflicts with and within many nations
and it appeared that the entire world had
uncontollably slipped into total chaos. Bak€r
wrot€, "The clear issue al Paris was b€tween
organization and anarchy."56
The protagonists who comprised tlte
' Big Four" Allied Powers at Paris were, along
with Wilson, Premier Georges Clemenceau of
France, Prime Minister Dayid Lloyd George of
Great Britain, and Premier Vittorio Orlando of
Italy. Upon Wilson's arrival in Paris, the ieaders
olthe Allied Powers, principally Clemenceau
and Lloyd George, did not groet him as had the
citizenry because they did not agree with his
concept of peace without victory. Thcir agendas
for negotiations, reparations, and distribution of
t€rritory were designed to cripple the defeated
enemies, and they found Wilson's anti-
imperialistic rhetoric was troublesome. France
desired total annihilation ofGermany since it
feared fuhue aggression from Germany, while
Greal Britain did not want to lose any realized
territorial gains from the war, and Italy seeking
greater relevancy in world affain wanted conaol
over the Adriatic ports-
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After months of negotiating and
diplomatic maneuvering, the Treaty of
Versailles, and contrary to what the concept of
"self-determination" called for, the Allied
Powers decided how tha concept would be
implemented. In so doing, they violated the very
notion for which it stood. The term "self-
determination" and the concept itselfwere
omitted from the Treaty ofVersailles and the
League ofNations Covenant. The Allied Powers
did not consider their colonies and protector8tes
candidates for "self-detemination" and took it
upon themselves to determine the fales ofthese
vanquished nations. In order to ensure their
continuing control of tenitory, they negotiated
secret side treaties for tlnse groups considered
less desirable or not useful.
There were many secret side tleaties,
some negotiated prior to the Paris Peace
Conference. The Sykes-Picot Treaty, the secret
undentanding between the govemments of
Britain and France that defined their respective
areas of control in the post-WWI Middle East,
was negotialed in I9l6 whel the war was going
badly for the allies and promises were easy to
make.3t Later, in a more complicated tirre in
1920, Britain and France negotiated lhe Treaty of
Sevres, impacting the same area.38 when the
Treaty of Se\Tes was deened rmacceptable and
unworkable, a new treaty, the Treaty of
Lausarme, was n€gotiat€d in l923.re Wilson was
very troubled by the existence ofthese side
treaties and viewed them as obstacles to the new
world order and global peace.
Wilson, expecting the Treaty of
Versailles to be based on the "Fourteen Points,"
came to the peace conference leading the United
States' negotiating team composed offour other
commissioners, dozens of scholars, diplomats,
bureaucrats, and clerks. The other American
commissioners or plenipotentiaries, as they were
called at Paris, were Colonel Edward House,
whom Wilson referred to as "my alter ego,"
Secretary of State Robert Lansing, General
Tasker Bliss, and retired diplomat Henry Whiie.
ln essence, Wilson had assembled a team of the
best expens available to him along with large
quantities of reference materials.a0
In assembling the American delegation,
Wilson made tlle strategic enor of only including
political allies and excluded any members ofthe
opposing Republican Party. Even his staunchest
Democrat supporter3 had ulged him to include
the likes of former President William Howard
Taft, former Secretary of Slate Elihu Root, or the
most senior Republican member of tlre Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge. MacMillan wrote that, "Wilson's
selection caused an uproar in the United States at
the time and has coused controvorsy ev€r
smce." '
In leading the American negotiation
team, Wilson put himself in a polemical and
difficult position, being a head of state while his
peers were all heads of govemments. This would
mise the expectations of Wilson's bargaining
strength for many ofthe interested Parties, but in
reality would leave him lifil€ room for
negotiation or maneuvering. On leading the
delegation, secretary of Sttte Robert Lansing
stated that ha believed Wilson was' "making one
ofthe greatest mistakes of his career and
imperiling his repuhtion."a2 Wilson made the
decision to lead the team for several reasons, the
primary reason being personal. Hisrorian
Kendrick Clements wrot€:
He wantedto be remembered as the
aulhor of a new idernational structute
that could abolishwar; such an
achievemenl was worth tahing chances
for. Wilson really believed that he alone
had a clear vision of 'a world organized
for justice and democracy,' qnd that the
other nations ioined to defeat Cermany
had far less noble aims."'
The Treaty ofVersailles officiallY
ended WWI. The "Big Three," Wilson, Lloyd
Oeorge, and Clemenceau, confolled the
negotiations and s€t out to redraw the political
map ofthe world. The four key points of the
Treaty w€re: revised boundaries, the setting of
reparations, disarmament ofcermany, and the
creation of a League ofNations. After six
months ofnegotiations, Wilson signed the Treaty
ofVersailles and retumed to the Unit€d States
bringing this new document that not only
delineated the peace, but created a now
organization to promote a lasting peace, the
League of Nations.
The Constiiution ofthe United States
bestows on the S€nate t]le power to ratify all
treaties. There was bitter disagreement
conceming the Treaty ofVersailles amongst the
senators. Many senators belisved that Wilson
had negotiated a policy of appeasernent and
would be placing America's power under
intemational control. Others were suspicious of
"entanglements' in Europe and demanded
changes in the Treaty in exchange for its
ratification. Wilson had personal and philosophic
differences with senaiors from both parties that
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were never bridged. However, Wilson refused
any sort ofcompromise to gain passage ofth€
Treaty. Ambrosius wrote, "Wilson's
intransigence forsstalled any compromise
between Republican and Democratic senators,
thefeby pr€venting them tom approving the
Venailles Treaty.'#
When faced with the reality of certain
def€at in the Senate, and with control ofhis own
party slipping, Wilson decided to rakes his plight
directly to the people and began a tour of the
western United States to promote public support
for the Treaty. Americans, in general, had an
isolationist tradition and Wilson's rhetoric
seemed to answer the objections posed by his
critics. Popular suppod appeared to be growing
on his side when his health forced the
cancellalion ofthe tour. Wilson's health never
returned completely.
Ulrimately, the ditrerences between
Wilson and the United States Senate would lead
to the defeat ofthe Treaty. These differences
would everrtually affect American foreign
relations in a very profound manner. Historian
Lloyd Ambrosius wote, "Wilson's conception
ofa League was irrelevant to the real task of
peacemaking..."45 In the end, the United Stales
neverjoined the League ofNations and
nagotiated i1s own peace agreement with
Cermany. Over the coune of its existence, &om
19l9 to 1946, the League counted approximately
sixty member countries had been members of tlle
League. In 1946, al the end of World War lI, the
League ofNations was dissolved and the United
Nations was created to address the needs ofa
world dramatically changed yet again by
conflicts between nations around the globe.
Concerning the Middle East, as a result
of authoritarian rulers, the influence of extremist
religious leaders, the meddling ofthe Europeans,
the meddling ofthe United States, and the
violation of the concept of "self-determination,"
much ofthe region has become a haven for
terorism and religious fanaticism. Any lasting
peace must take into consideration the "self-
determination" ofthose who still struggl€ to
determine their o*n destinies.
Conclusion and Analysis
Woodrow Wilson, a brilliant thinker,
brimming with imagination and idealism,
conceived a grand ideological panacea embodied
in the "Fourteen Points" and the concept of"self-
determination." However, despite his
commendable imagination, idealism, and
intentions, his failwe of leadership, which
includes the failure ofeffective diplomacy and
the failure oftrust, is a primary cause oftoday,s
"Broken Middle East."
Wilson's noble concept of "self-
determination" was not the problem; the problem
was how the concapt was applied. Instead of
allowing ethnic and culhrral gro[ps to develop
their own identities and desthies, Wilson
compromised with and allowed the Allied
Powefs, most notably Britain and France, to
dissect their defeaied enemies' empires
according to their desires and decide for
themselves how the concept of-self-
determination" would be applied. In so doing,
the policy was not implement€d equally or fairly.
For instance, colonies and protectorates of the
Allied Powers were not considered candidales
for "seltdetermination" and secret side treaties
were negotiated for those groups.
Once these new nations came into
being, th€ concept of "self-detennination" was
abus€d becaus€ the major powers did not
relinquish their control, nor did they depart the
tenitory. For example, Eglpt became a
sover€ign nation in t922, but the British did not
leave until the 1950s, more than thirty years
later. The sta& ofthe region is embodied in the
words of authof Martin Walker, "Eighty years
on, pan-Arabism has faltered, disuedited by the
recurrent failures and authoritariaa rule, and by
the rivalries between the various Arab nations
the British and the French cawed from the
Ottoman corpse.'16
Wilson's complicity is at the root of t}le
failure of effective leadorship. His leadership
failure is evidenced in several areas: a failure to
lead at Paris, a failure to lead in fie Senate treaty
fight, and his failure of overall leadership by
refirsing to take advice, compromise, and
delegate authority. Leadership is at once an
abstract and esoteric quality and ability. In
witing on leadenhip, Kevin Cashman stated,
"We see it only as something people
do.. .Leadership is a process, an inlimate
expression ofwho we are. lr is our being in
action."47 Part ofbeing an effective leader is
having the ability and will to affect policy by
negotiation with parties and taking them to the
desired destination through logic, persuasion,
and compromise.
In Europe, Wilson was initially hailed
as a visionary and thus seen as a strong leader. In
other words, he was a strong leader as long as he
limitcd himself to expressing high ideals of
foreign policy through inspirational prose.
Wilson could not master the gritqr reality of
politics and lacked the ability to influence and
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control two mast€rs ofthe trade, Clemenceau
and Lloyd George. Compared to these two,
Wilson was a provincial amatour. He mado
compromisos with them which set tho conditions
for th€ dysfimctions seen in the Middle East
today. By being a weak leader and poor
implementer, he failed to control the
machinations of Britain and France along with
their agendas, with the result being that secret
side-treaties were made which cynically
corrupted the concept of "self-determination" in
the service of national self-interest.
The Paris Peace Conference took place
at a time when world thinking had begun to
change, and at tiat time the leaders ofthe Allied
Powers had the ability to re-create the world's
political divisions. They, with the possible
exception of Wilson, had little understanding of
the new world they had entered as the emerging
world was one in which people believed they had
the right to exist without the limitation of
boundaries. As a result, a "clash ofcultures"
ensued as Samuel P. Huntington later argued in
his landmark work, The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Qrder. Wilson,
possibly more than any otler American president
b€fore or after, had the unique position ofbeing
able to wield tremendous power and influence in
rhe re-mapping ofthe wodd, yet failed ty not
upholding his own principles.
Leadership is also necessary in bringing
legislators together on a piece of legislation.
wilson had the ability to propos€ and gain
passage of large blocks of l€gislation, as
evidenced by his 'New Freedom" proposals,
'*ten his own party controlled the Congress.
However, he did not like tie give and take of
t'olftical regotiation and once he arrived at a
drcision, he was not willing to change his mind
and seldom compromised. Ambrosius wrote,
-B ilson stood virtually alone in his adamant
refirsal to comprornise with Republicans lo save
$e Versailles Treaty.as
In the l9l8 elections, the Republican
Par!. won conlrol ofthe United States Senate,
rtich would become a key obstacle in Wilson's
rbilitv to pass any ofhis desired legislation,
e4ecially the rarification of Treaty of Versailles.
l-ilson's nemesis, Henry Cabot Lodge, who
=a ld prove to be a formidable opponent,
hEceme the Senate Majority Leader a d
i:airman ofthe Senate Foreign Relations
amittee. Lodge defined the direction the
!s b' elected Senate would tak€. Wilson would
aio*. the personal animosities between them to
!.ore to be a tremendous obstacle to any
compromise possibilities or ability to work
together, exacerbating this leadership failure.
The Foreign Relations Commitiae
recommended numerous amendments and
changes to th€ Treaty, however, they were all
rejected by Wilson. Senalors from Wilson's own
party expressed reservations lhat Wilson
rejected. He mistakenly thought he could
pressure, rather than negotiate with the leaders of
the Republican controlled United Strtes Senate
to mtiry the Treaty ofVersailles and the League
ofNations Covenant. Link wrote that this flaw,
" . . . revealed his t€mperarnental inability to
cooperate with men who were not willing to
follow his lead completely.'re Faced with an
opposition party majority, Wilson mistak€nly
believed he could take his cause directly to tle
people rather than negotiat€ with Senate leaders
to gain passage. Ofthis folly, Tulis wrote,
"... Wilson's intransient refusal to compromise
with the Senate. . .was irrational and was the
decisive cause ofthe defeai ofthe Treaty."so
And, Ambrosius rlTote, "The paranoid style of
Wilson's politics reinforced the rigidity ofhis
all-or-nothing stance in tle treaty fight."sr
konically, the Republicans held only a
two seat majority. ln facing this fact, wilson
could have built his own coalilion to pass t}te
Tr€aty in the Senate, trut this would have
required some compromise. Numerous changes
and compromises were put forward by members
ofboth parties in the Senate; however, all were
rejected by Wilson. He insisted that tlle Treaty
not b€ changed in any way and be approved
conpletely as he brought il to the Senate from
Paris. His inability or u1-willingness to
compromise caused multiple defeats ofthe
Treaty ofVersailles in the United States Senate,
with the final vote coming on March 19, 1920,
nine months after Wilson had signed the
document in Paris.
A failure ofeffective leadership is
evidenced by Wilson's mlssiep in not seeking
counsel. Wilson, a loner, remained independent
fiom his advisors and distrusted advice from
people with whom he did not agr€e. He did not
have an inner circle ofadvisors and did not
establish a close working relationship with the
members ofhis cabinet. He would eventually
shut out eveu his closest adyisor, Colonel House.
At the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson
overestimated his ability to shape intemational
policy when he bypassed the State Departfirenl to
lead th€ negotiating team- Ambrosius wrote,
"He used his presidential power in a vain
endeavor to roshape the world."52 Had wilson
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Inot beet the head plenipotentiary, and remained
away from the direct negotiations, he could have
taken credit for the successes and distanced
himself from the failues in Paris.
Finally, Wilson made a poor political
move by not including any members ofthe
opposition party or members olthe Senate on the
negotiation team. Conceming this hilure, Link
wrote that Wilson had not lost the habii, ..of
fiaking his political opponents also his personal
enemies, whom he despised and loathed. He had
to hold the reins and do the driving alone; it was
the only kind of leadership he knew.,'si
Leadership placed in the context of a
nation can have failures. In rejecting the Treaty
ofversailles and lat€r negotiating a separate
peace with Germany, the United States received
all ofthe benefits it would have under the Treaty,
with none ofthe obligations. Ifthe United States
had taken the leadenhip in the League of
Nations, the organization may well have
survived. MacMillan $Tote, "American
exceptionalism has always had two sides: the
one eager to set the world to rights, the other
ready to turn its back with contempl if its
message should be ignored."'a Yean later, the
United States would learn through the Japanese
attaak on Pearl Harbor in I 94 I that neutrality
and isolation in world affais lvas not a
reasonable or viable option in an ever
increasingly interdependent world.
Wilson's lbilure of leadership led to a
failure ol effective diplomacy. Lloyd E.
Ambrosius wote, "Wilson's failure in the treaty
fight left the United States withont clear
direction for its foreign policy.,,55 Although the
League ofNations did provide a framework for
foreign relations, contradictions were $'ritten in
the articles on whether to snforce or reyise the
Treaty of Versailles. further, Ambrosius wrote,
"Rather than decide in I 9 I 9 whether to seek
peace through collective sanctions or
appeasement, th€ president wanted to retain both
options for the future, The covenaht thus
embodied his paradoxical idea of'progressive
order' tbrough intemational social control.',r6
This inability to make a decision contributed to
his failed diplomacy. In a situation where taking
a strong stance ard a strong leadership role using
strong diplomalic skills early on was vital to
future successes, Wilson wanted i1 both ways,
thus setting a dangerous precedent for future
administrations.
The foreign policy ofthe United States
has suffered from aa identity problem in that it
has had a difficult time in dealing with an ever-
increasing pluralistic and intefdependent world.
As a result, America has vacillated between
isolationism and intemationalism. While the
United States often speaks ofcolleotive security,
it has acted unilaterally, at times, in places like
baq. Each American president since and
including Wilson became a prisoner of a world
view that fundamentally misdiagnosed the
central challenges ofthe Middle Easl dwing his
time,
Wilson's failure of leadership led to a
failure oftrust. The failure ofa lasting trust
between the West and the Middle Eastem
countries can be traced back as far as the middle
Ages and the Crusades, more than 1,300 yean
ago. The failure oftrust in the modern Middle
East is rooted in how the United States and oth€r
westem nations have viewed their roles there.
Today there is a blend oi nationatism with
radical religious fiIrdamenal ism sweeping
across the Middle East. Woven through this lack
oltrust is the view by many ofthe peoples ofthe
Middle East that the West only desires access
and control oftheir oil rrssrves. Oil had not vet
becom.e the globally rraded commodity that it is
today." Tle majority ofoil traded came from
other areas, namely the United States. In 1913,
Persia, now Iran, was the largest producer of
Middle East oil and in that year the Unjted States
produced 140 times more oil than persia.58
Today, much has changed and the largest
producers ofoil are the countries ofthe Middle
East
Wilson violated the trust he espoused in
the "Fourte€n Points"' and in the concept of..self-
determination" through his complicity with
Britain and France, allowing th€m to make secret
side agreements conceming the Middle East and
carve it up without regard to the desires of its
peoples and countries. Wilson was dissatisfied
with this arrangement and, as a result, he created
the Commission of Inquiry in the summer of
1919, also known as the King-Crane
Commission, named after its leaders, Henry
King and Charles Cmne. fhe Comfiission was
charged with the mission of determining what
the peoples ofthe Middle East desired in the
form oftheir own govemance. The Commission
concluded, "Dangers may readily arise from
unwise and unfaithful dealings with this people,
but lhere is great bope of peace and prog-ess if
they are handled frankly and lo1all1."5o l-he
Commission's findings assembled in the King-
Crane Report were suppressed by the United
States government until 1922, after all the
negotiations were completed because its contents
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*('E cotrsidered "explosive" and conhary !o
rra was decided by the Allied Powers. I{ad theqon been published promptly, America's
irrign responsibilities and diplomacy with the
Hxtile East might have developed differently.e
T-rlson knew through the King-Crane
Comission what the people of the Middle East
iesired. He chose, howeveq to suppress the
::srls ofthe study. In so doing, the West--and
ddmarely Wilson himself-continued to impos€
Ed extend its o\an way of life on rhe Middle
E€sr and its peoples.
Th€ United States had no presence or
wolvement in the Middl€ East prior to the
Traty of Versailles and the Arabs did not view
::€ United Stat€s as a colonial power, as th€y did
Briain and France. Howevef, ryith the dissection
-.f the Ottoman Empire and the other decisions
$ade al the Paris Peace Conference, the United
Staes suddenly seemed to be thrust forward to
piay a colossal role in world affain and in the
Middle East. The last twelve American
Fresidents have made policy decisions, good and
bad, dnt have affected the Middle East and the
role ofthe United States in that region. Each
Cecision has in one way or anotler contributed to
the admosity of the Arab world towads the
United States. Although there were many
characiers involved, Wilson's key failure of
leadership set the stage for the policy decisions
that affect American foreign relations in the
roodem Middle Eart.
Today, tle most prominent problems
affecting the Modern Middle East are root€d in
those decisions made at the Paris Peac€
Conference and laid out in the Treaty of
Versailles at the end of WWI. The list includes,
but is not limited to, the endless struggle
between Arabs and Jews over land each thought
was promised to them, the ongoing quest for
Kurdish "self-determination," the assembly of
opposing cultural groups that are still struggling
to become a cohesive civil society, the
establishment of disputed national borders, and
ihe current entanglements ofthe United States in
Iraq. Ironically, Clemenceau perhaps said it best,
"...this treaty will bring us burdens, troubles,
miseries, difficulties, and that will continue for
long years."6r
Woodrow Wilson is considered by
many historians to be one ofthe most intelligent
men to ever occupy the Oral Office. He was one
ofthe most 
€ducated and is certain to be included
among the best ofAmerican political thinkers.
Although a gifted thinker and conceptualizer, he
lacked the ability to implemeDt his foreign
poliry. Wilson rms elected pr€sident at a crucial
time in the history of the wodd when America
was coming of age. Its population centers bad
grolvn to extend from on€ coast to the other and
it was beginning to venture into the unchsrtered
areas offoreign wars and diplornary. America,
by this time, had esablished itselfas an
industrial power, providing both goods and
financing to foreign nations. It was an orighator
and developer of life changing inventions, the
land where all seemed possible, and the land of
"exceptional destiny."
Woodmw Wilson was not able to mak€
the lasting contributions to world peace ofwhich
he dreamed, in part because he could not deliver
his concept of producing well-being for all
peoples. William Appleman Williams wrote,
"Despite the series ofspecific and general
revolutions that occurred throughout the world
between his election in 1912 and his death in
1924, Wilson never seriously altered his
conception of the world."62 Further, Ambrosious
analyzed, "The underlying problem of Wilson's
legacy in American foreign relatiots stemm€d
Aom the fallacies ofhis intellectual framework.
He hoped to achieve 'progressive order' around
the globe through the L€ague ofNations. [Iis
conception of international social control
presupposed the rl'rlogy betw€en history and
natue."63 Despite this shortcoming and io what
he believed to be the best ofhis ability, Wilson
stood on principle and worked diligently to
perpetuate America's grsahess and standing in
the world. Ray Stannard Baker wrote that
Wilson, ".. .never upon any occasion whatsoever,
no matter how difficult, failed to represent
America and fte American people witlr
distinction."s
To paraphrase an earlier quote, the
world is being swept by ideologjcal, economic.
and political changes today that are so profound
there is little hope of controlling and cham€ling
them. The attacks on the United Statas of
September I l, 2001 findamentally changed the
world and fi.rther reinforced the necessity of
global inGrdependence and coop€ration. To state
that current evefts are a struggle between good
and evil is not only naiive, but overly simplistic.
Perhaps it was said best by President John F.
Kennedy, in his famous speech at AmericaD
University, " . . . in the fnal analysis our most
basic common link is the fact flat we all inhabit
this planet. We all breatie the same air..."65
These words apply for all times and can certainly
be applied to any foreign policy. Beyond the
common links and thoughts lay actions and
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policy decisions, successfirl and unsuccessful-
good and bad.
All ofthe public policy failures
conceming the mod€m Middle East cannot be
laid at the feet of Woodrow Wilson. He did have,
however, the oppoftunity to affect and dircct
great change at a key point in history. Roben
Endicon Osgood wrote......no president was
ever in more complete control ofthe conduct of
the nation's foreign affairs than Woodrow
Wilson.''66 His concepts and ideas were noble
and genuine, however, altruistic and possibly
unreasonable. Wilson's failure was not a failwe
of imagination; however, imagination witbout
effective implementation and leadenhip is a
Iosing proposition in tbe public policy arena.
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.Appendix No. l-"The Fourteen Points"
, Open covenan* ofpeace. openly arrived a'
lftei wbich there shall be no private international
:mderstandings ofany kind but diPlomacy shall
soceed always fraokly and in the public view'
Il. Absolute freedom ofnavigation upon tie
seas, outside lenitorial waters' alike in peace and
in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole
o{ in part by iniemational action for the
3Dforceme of intemational covenants.
IIl . The removal, so far as possible, of all
economic barrisrs and the establishment ofan
equaliry oftrade conditions among all the
nationi consenting to tle peace and associating
rhemselves for its maintenance.
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that
Dational amamsnts will be reduced to the lowest
point consbtent with domestic safety.
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial
adiusunent ofall colonial claims, based upon a
strict observance ofthe principle that in
determining all such questions of sovereignty the
interests ofthe populations concerned must have
equl weight with the equitable claims of the
government whose title is to be determined'
VL The evacuation of all Russian tenitory and
such a settlement of all questions affecting
Russia as will secure the best and freest
cooperation ofths other nations ofthe world in
obtaining for her an unhampered and
unembarrassed opportunity for the independent
determination of her o*n political development
and national policy and assure her ofa sincere
welcome into the society offree nations under
institutions ofher own choosing; and, more than
a w€lcome, assistance also of every kind that she
mav need and may herselfdesire. The $eafinent
accorded Russia by her sisrer nations in the
months to come will be the acid test oftheir
eood will, of their comprehension of her needs
L distinguished from rheir own interests. and of
their intelligent and unselfish sympalhy'
VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must
tre evacuated and restored, without any attemPt
to limit the sovereignty which she enjol's in
common with all other free nations. No other
single act will serve as this will serve to restore
corifidence among the nations in the laws which
thev have themselves set and determined for the
eovemment oftheir relations with one anothet'
iVithour rhis healing acr lhe whole structure and
validity of int€mational law is forever impairod'
VlI. All French tsrritory should be freed and tlte
invaded portions restored, and the lvrong done to
France by Prussia in I87I in the matter of
Alsace-Lorraine, which has unscttled the peace
of the world for nearly fifty years, should be
righted, in order thet peace may once more be
made secufe in the interest of all.
IX. A readjustment ofthe frontien of Italy
should be effected along cleady recognizable
lines of nationalitY-
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place
among the nations we wish to see safeguarded
and assured, should be accorded 15e freest
opportunity to autonomous de!'€lopment'
XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be
evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia
accofded free and secure access to the sea; and
the relations ofthe several Balkan states to one
another determined by friendly counsel along
historically established lines of allegiance and
nationatity; and inlemational guarantees of the
oolitical and economic independence and
ierritorial integrity ofthe several Balkan states
should be entered into.
XII. The Twkish portion ofthe present Ottoman
Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty'
but the other oationalities whicb are now under
Turkish mle should be assured an undoubted
security oflife and an absolutely unmolested
opportunity of autonomous development' and the
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a
free passage to the ships and commerce of all
nations under international guarantees
XIIL An independent Polish state should be
erected which should include the t€rritories
inhabited by indisputably Polish populations'
which should be assured a free and secure access
to the sea, and whose political and economic
independence and tenitorial integrity should be
guaxanteed by intemational cov€nant'
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XW. A general association of nations must be
formed under specific covenants for the purpose
of affording mutual guarantees ofpolitical
independence and territorial integrity to great
and small states alike.
Delivered to a Joint Session of Congress
January 8, 1918
Source:
httprharyrv.lib.byuslrv:rdh/'wwri/!91 8/ I 4points.
html. Accessed 11-16-2404.
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